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The ability to maintain and manipulate information across temporal delays is a
fundamental requirement to bridge the gap between perception and action. In the case
of higher-order behavior, the maintenance of rules and strategies is particularly helpful in
bridging this gap. The prefrontal cortex (PFC) has long been considered critical for such
processes, and research has focused on different subdivisions of PFC to gain an insight
into their diverse contributions to these mechanisms. Substantial evidence indicates that
dorsolateral PFC (dlPFC) is an important structure for maintaining information across
delays, with cells actively firing across delays and lesions to this region causing deficits in
tasks involving delayed responses and maintenance of rules online. Frontopolar cortex
(FP), on the other hand, appears to show the opposite pattern of results, with cells
not firing across delays and lesions to this region not affecting the same rule-based,
delayed response tasks that are impaired following dlPFC lesions. The body of evidence
therefore suggests that dlPFC and FP’s contributions to working memory differ. In this
article, we will provide a perspective on how these regions might implement distinct
but complementary and interactive functions that contribute to more general temporally-
extended processes and support flexible, dynamic behavior.
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WORKING MEMORY AND PREFRONTAL CORTEX (PFC)
A fundamental aspect of cognition is the ability to maintain and manipulate information even
when it cannot be directly perceived in the form of sensory input, for example because it is no
longer accessible. Besides contributing to basic memory processes, such as the passive maintenance
of information for future use, this type of cognitive processing is also essential in order to associate
actions and/or stimuli with outcomes that may be temporally distant from the onset of the action or
stimulus themselves. Furthermore, it is advantageous for the planning and execution of sequential
behavioral plans that span longer timescales than that of a single action.
The prefrontal cortex (PFC) has long been considered critical for this cognitive
ability, often referred to by the very general and umbrella term ‘‘working memory’’.
Several studies have linked PFC cells’ activities with the internal representation of
information, ranging from the encoding of stimulus features, to value, to more abstract
rules, goals and strategies (Asaad et al., 1998, 2000; White and Wise, 1999; Wallis et al.,
2001; Bunge et al., 2003; Kennerley et al., 2011), as well as with the maintenance and
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manipulation of information across time (Fuster and Alexander,
1971; Goldman-Rakic, 1995; Miller et al., 1996; Bunge et al., 2003;
Mushiake et al., 2006; Mansouri et al., 2007). PFC damage in
human patients has been linked to severe deficits in memory
and planning (Bauer and Fuster, 1976; Goldman-Rakic, 2011;
Fuster, 2008; Thompson-Schill et al., 2002) and such patterns of
impairment have also been extensively reported in the animal
literature (for a comprehensive review, see Fuster, 2008). In
particular, the effects of large targeted PFC ablations on a range
of tasks in non-human primates have led some authors to
hypothesize a role for PFC in processing specifically temporally
extended and/or temporally complex information (Wilson et al.,
2010).
DORSOLATERAL AND FRONTOPOLAR
CORTICES AND TEMPORALLY EXTENDED
PREFRONTAL FUNCTIONS
Evidence suggests that, rather than being a functionally
homogeneous region, PFC may comprise a network of
cytoarchitecturally and functionally distinct subdivisions
(Walker, 1940; Carmichael and Price, 1994; Petrides and
Pandya, 2002; Petrides, 2005; Brodmann, 1909). Therefore,
one question concerns whether particular subdivisions of PFC
might be specifically crucial for particular processes referred
to under the general rubric of working memory processes.
Fuster, 2008 distinguished between lateral prefrontal and medial
prefrontal syndromes, with the former, but not the latter, being
characterized by impairments in, amongst other functions,
working memory. Indeed, a large number of findings regarding
the properties of PFC cells and the effects of PFC damage on
working memory tasks come from investigations into lateral
PFC, and particularly the dorsolateral prefrontal (dlPFC) regions
(Figures 1A–E) including, in the macaque, the area surrounding
the principal sulcus (Petrides, 2000). Human neuroimaging
studies have shown that a region anteriorly adjacent to dlPFC,
namely frontopolar cortex (FP), approximately corresponding
to Brodmann’s area 10 (Figures 1A–E), is also particularly
active during working memory and episodic memory tasks in
humans (Gilbert et al., 2006a,b) and it has been associated with
prospective memory (PM) functions, i.e., the maintenance of
information related to a future action plan across time-delays
(Okuda et al., 2007; Burgess et al., 2011; Volle et al., 2011).
Consistent with Fuster’s distinction between lateral and medial
PFC syndromes, FP’s memory functions have also generally
been associated with its lateral portion, which, in humans, has
been found to closely resemble macaque’s dorsolateral area 46
in terms of functional connectivity with wider cerebral cortex
(Figure 1F; Sallet et al., 2013; Neubert et al., 2014).
Nevertheless, recent studies have also begun to highlight
some differences between the two regions, for example in
neurophysiological profiles of cells in dlPFC vs. FP. Cells in
the dorsal and lateral aspect of FP, unlike more posterior
cells in dlPFC per se, do not appear to fire across temporal
delays (Tsujimoto et al., 2010, 2012), which is a property
generally deemed characteristic of temporally extended memory
processes. It is therefore possible that dlPFC and FP might
be supporting different processes contributing to more general
memory functions. One way to investigate this possibility
is to look at the effects of selective lesions to each of
these two areas on the performance of the same type of
cognitive tasks, in order to discern whether their respective
contributions can be differentiated. While several experiments
have investigated the effects of dlPFC lesions on various
components of working memory, up until very recently, the
absence of studies on the effects of targeted FP lesions had
precluded such a comparison. In the light of new experimental
findings, we can now begin to form some hypotheses on
the potential distinct contributions of these two regions to
cognition.
STIMULUS FEATURES
In tasks of recognition memory such as delay-matching-to-
sample (DMS) or delay-non-matching-to-sample (DNMS), the
subject has to maintain a memory trace of the perceptual
features of a sample stimulus, in order to accurately compare
them with those of a test stimulus (or stimuli) after delays of
varying length. Cells in dlPFC have been shown to fire during
delays in such tasks, with activity correlated to the individual
properties of the sample (Miller et al., 1996; Sawaguchi and
Yamane, 1999). In a series of classic studies, Fuster and colleagues
showed that, in the monkey, cooling of dlPFC regions including
sulcal area 46 caused deficits in spatial delayed-response and
DMS tasks with increased delays, but not on simultaneous
matching-to-sample tasks (Fuster and Alexander, 1970; Bauer
and Fuster, 1976). Further investigations have suggested a more
nuanced role for dlPFC in DMS/DNMS tasks than that of
passive general maintenance of information, as lesions to dlPFC
can leave performance on these tasks relatively unimpaired
(Passingham, 1975; Bachevalier and Mishkin, 1986; Kowalska
et al., 1991), but can affect specific processes that contribute
to DMS/DNMS performance, such as visuospatial processes
(Passingham, 1975; Levy and Goldman-Rakic, 2000) or the
selection and manipulation of information that is maintained
‘‘online’’ across temporal delays in order to guide choice behavior
(Petrides, 2000; Rowe et al., 2000).
While no recordings of FP cells during DMS/DNMS task
exist to date, we recently investigated the effects of targeted
lesions to the macaque’s FP on both tasks, and found that,
unlike dlPFC lesions, these had no effect on any aspect of the
animals’ performance of either task (Figure 2A). The FP animals
were undistinguishable from controls both in reaching criterion
for the tasks and in their performance across varying delays
(Boschin et al., 2015). This suggests that, despite its activation
during working memory tasks, FP is not essential to support the
maintenance of visual information across delays, nor for guiding
choice behavior based on the type of visual information and rules
that underpin DMS/DNMS tasks.
ABSTRACT RULES AND STRATEGIES
The need to maintain or manipulate information across time
is not exclusively a requirement of situations where one needs
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FIGURE 1 | Anatomy and connectivity of prefrontal cortex (PFC) in the human and monkey brain. (A) Lateral view of human brain (adapted from Brodmann
(1909), pp. 108, Figure 85, with permission from Springer): frontopolar cortex (FP) (red) is visible at the most anterior portion of the frontal lobe, identified
approximately as Brodmann area 10, with dlPFC (yellow) occupying the area immediately posterior and superior to FP. (B) Lateral, medial and inferior view of the
macaque’s PFC (adapted from Walker (1940), with permission from Wiley): FP (red) is visible at the tip of the macaque’s frontal lobe and dlPFC (yellow) is visible in the
tissue above and surrounding the principal sulcus. (C–E) Medial view of the human (C) (adapted from Ongür et al. (2003), with permission from Wiley) and macaque
(D,E) (adapted from Ongür et al. (2003) and Petrides and Pandya (1999), respectively, with permission from Wiley) PFC: FP (red) extends rostrally into the medial
surface of the PFC according to some cytoarchitectonical subdivisions (C,D—areas 10r and 10m). (F) Mapping of resting-state functional connectivity of FP
(medial—left, in purple—and lateral—right, in red) with more posterior areas, comparing connectivity in the macaque brain (top) with the human brain (bottom). Spider
plots illustrate the intensities of the coupling patterns between FP (location of the seed regions are illustrated in the central column, following the same color scheme)
and the target regions of interest. The connectivity profile of human medial FP (FPm) closely resembles that of medial area 10 (10m) the macaque brain. Human
lateral FP (FPl), on the other hand, appears to resemble macaque area 46, here shown in yellow (adapted from Neubert et al., 2014, with permission from Elsevier).
to hold a memory trace of a cue or stimulus that can no
longer be directly perceived, as in the case of DMS/DNMS
tasks. Even in the presence of constant sensory input, in the
form of visual stimuli for example, other types of task-relevant
information might be maintained, such as rules, strategies or
action plans. A large body of evidence does implicate both dlPFC
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FIGURE 2 | Patterns of spared and impaired performance following FP lesion in the macaque (adapted from Boschin et al., 2015): tasks (right) and
results (left). (A) Delayed-Matching/Delayed-Non-Matching-to-Sample: FP animals are not impaired compared to controls across several different delays.
(B) Objects-in-scenes: in this task, animals learn about which of a pair of foreground objects (alphanumeric characters, indicated by the red arrows) presented within
a complex scene is associated with reward. They are presented with 20 novel problems every day and in each daily session they are tested on that set of problems
eight times. Animals are tested for 15 days pre-operatively and post-operatively. For control animals, the greatest improvement in performance (measured as
decrease in percent error) was observed between the first and second run, indicating rapid learning. FP animals, on the other hand, did not show such substantial
improvement between the first and second run, indicating a deficit in rapidly learning about the relative values of novel stimuli. (C) Successive single-problem
learning. The animals learn about which of a single pair objects (clipart images) is associated with reward with problems presented successively. In the first run they
are given forced-choice trials where the rewarded and unrewarded item are presented individually (order counter-balanced across trials), then they are tested on that
problem 10 times successively. A session comprises 10 such problems and each animal completes 10 sessions pre- and post-operatively. FP animals were again
impaired on rapid, one-trial learning about the relative value of novel stimuli, (here measured as the decrease in percent error between the forced-choice phase and
the first presentation of a problem between the two stimuli). (D) Acquisition of a new abstract rule: animals are trained to perform a simultaneous matching-to-sample
task requiring them to choose a stimulus on the basis of two concurrent abstract rules (“matching” and “smaller than”). As an intermediate phase they are trained on
the new “smaller-than” rule for 3 days, which is depicted in this figure. Control animals showed a significant decrease in percent error from the first to the second day
of learning to apply the new “smaller than” rule. This is indicative of rapid learning about the value of the novel abstract rule. FP animals, however, did not display
such an improvement.
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and FP in the encoding, maintenance and manipulation of task
instructions, abstract rules and strategies (Rowe et al., 2000;
Strange et al., 2001;Wallis et al., 2001;Mushiake et al., 2006; Sakai
and Passingham, 2006; Christoff and Keramatian, 2007; Rowe
et al., 2007; Sakai, 2007; Buckley et al., 2009; Tsujimoto et al.,
2011; Mian et al., 2012), and one hypothesis about FP function
posits that this area sits atop of a prefrontal hierarchy where
increasingly abstract information is represented in rostral vs.
caudal PFC regions (Badre and D’Esposito, 2007; Koechlin and
Summerfield, 2007; Badre, 2008). Therefore one possibility is that
FP’s role in temporally extended cognitive processing can only
be uncovered when the task involves a higher level of abstraction
than in DMS/DNMS.
While any type of rule-based behavior benefits from reliable
and consistent maintenance of rules and context across time,
this type of processing is particularly useful in situations where
rules or instructions are not explicitly cued on every trial and/or
are not kept constant, but, rather, change dynamically. While
in versions of DMS/DNMS when the rule varies from trial-
to-trial, but is nonetheless cued, significant BOLD activity is
elicited in ventral PFC but not dlPFC (Bunge et al., 2003), activity
in dlPFC is found in contexts where rules are not explicitly
cued and, for example, have to be inferred by stay/switch cues
(Forstmann et al., 2005), have to be learnt by trial-an-error
(Monchi et al., 2001; Lie et al., 2006), or have to be decided for
oneself (Bengtsson et al., 2009). Furthermore, FP cells have been
shown to increase activity when feedback indicates that responses
are correct according to the current strategy, but only when they
are not directly cued (Tsujimoto et al., 2010, 2012). Therefore,
both dlPFC and FP appear to be more engaged in contexts
where uncued behavioral alternatives have to be maintained
and differentially selected depending on changes in contextual
demands.
Variants of theWisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST)—where
subjects are required to respond by matching a sample to one of
several test items according to uncued rules that vary dynamically
across the session—have proved valuable in animal and human
neuropsychological studies investigating the underlying neural
mechanisms supporting such behavior. In a monkey-analog of
the WCST, single-cell recordings in the macaque’s principal
sulcus (area 46 and 9/46) have identified cells that encode and
maintain a representation of the currently relevant rule both
within and between trials (Mansouri et al., 2006) and, in a
conflict-version of the task, a representation of the level of
conflict experienced on the current and previous trials was also
found in the same area (Mansouri et al., 2007). Consistent with
these findings, lesions to this region impair the animal’s ability to
maintain the rule in memory across increasing delays (Buckley
et al., 2009), as well as the ability to adapt behavior in response
to varying levels of conflict (Mansouri et al., 2007). This indicates
that the monkey principal sulcus is essential for supporting the
maintenance and exploitation of dynamically changing task rules
and task-relevant contextual information across time.
As in the case of DMS/DNMS tasks, to date no recordings
have been carried out in the macaque FP during the WCST
analog. However, recent findings about the effects of lesions to
this area indicate that, unlike dlPFC lesions, FP damage does
not impair animals on either rule maintenance or rule switching
in the standard version, nor does it impair the conflict version
of the task (Mansouri et al., 2015). This may be seen as further
consistent with findings reporting neurons that encode rules
and strategies in dlPFC but not in FP (Mansouri et al., 2006;
Tsujimoto et al., 2010, 2011, 2012).
Nevertheless, while FP animals were not impaired in any
aspect of the WCST analogs, FP lesions did nonetheless have an
effect on performance, in the form of an enhancement compared
to controls. FP lesioned animals were better at adapting their
behavior following exposure to conflict and were also less
susceptible to intervening distractors, regardless of salience,
being better able to maintain the relevant rule in memory
compared to controls (Mansouri et al., 2015). This pattern of
enhancements after FP lesions, contrasted with the pattern of
impairments following dlPFC lesions in the same task, suggests
that, while dlPFC seems to be fundamental for maintaining and
selecting the appropriate behavioral strategies, FP may play a
very different role in this type of abstract and dynamic cognitive
behavior.
EVALUATING THE RELATIVE VALUE OF
NOVEL ALTERNATIVES: A PROPOSED
CONTRIBUTION OF FRONTOPOLAR
CORTEX TO COGNITION
We hypothesize that a key contribution of FP to cognition is in
supporting the exploration and evaluation of the relative value of
different alternatives, particularly when novel. This hypothesis is
supported by the effects of FP lesions across a range of behavioral
tasks, in particular the findings of very specific effects of such
lesions on rapid learning about novel alternatives across three
different tasks: an objects-in-scenes task (Figure 2B), a successive
single-problem learning task (Figure 2C), and the acquisition
of a new abstract rule (‘‘smaller than’’) in a simultaneous visual
discrimination task (Figure 2D; Boschin et al., 2015).
In these tasks, control animals showed a sharp decrease in
errors in the early stages of choosing between new alternative
scenes and objects, or acquiring a novel alternative rule,
indicating that they were able to rapidly extract information
about the relative value of these novel alternatives. FP lesioned
animals, on the other hand, showed no such pattern of rapid
learning (see Figures 2B–D), but were indistinguishable from
controls in later stages of learning, where error rates decreased
more gradually (Boschin et al., 2015). This indicates that FP
might be crucial for a mechanism that aids the rapid extraction
of the relative value of different behavioral options, above and
beyond the kind that can be implemented through repeated,
direct experience with the outcome of each alternative. This
mechanismmight involve the computation of internal inferences
about the value of unchosen alternatives relative to the value of
those that have been directly chosen. Animals with an intact FP
might be at an advantage compared to animals without an FP
because they are able to infer more about the potential value
of unchosen options based on their experience with the chosen
option.
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This hypothesis is consistent with the data from Mansouri
et al. (2015) about the enhancing effects of FP lesions in contexts
where distractors (such as free reward and novel tasks between
trials of the WCST) may represent alternatives that the animal
perceives as being potentially relevant to goal-directed behavior.
If, as we hypothesize, FP is involved in the ongoing process of
evaluating alternatives in relation to one another, it would be
expected to both facilitate rapid learning about novel alternatives,
as well as bias animals to explore the potential value of novel
alternatives that turn out to be mere distractors. Therefore,
animals without a FP would not be biased in such a manner and
better able to exploit reward opportunities from ongoing goal-
directed behavior when faced with distraction, as demonstrated
by Mansouri et al. (2015). Similarly, they could better adapt
their behavior to varying levels of conflict, in the absence of the
deleterious effects of distraction (Mansouri et al., 2015). Indeed,
patients with lesions to FP have been found to perform better
than controls in tasks that involve concentration (Petrie, 1952;
Burgess et al., 2012). This would also be consistent with Rowe
et al. (2007) findings that patients with FP lesions made fewer
errors than controls on ‘‘stay’’ trials, but more errors on ‘‘switch’’
trials, which is consistent with the idea of increased focus on
the current task set ignoring potential alternatives. Indeed, FP
activity in human subjects was recently found to be correlated
with the difference in value between chosen vs. unchosen options
(Boorman et al., 2009, 2011) as well as with exploratory behavior
(Daw et al., 2006) and changes in FP functional connectivity
were reported when subjects switch to a previously unchosen
alternative (Boorman et al., 2009).
This new framework could allow for new interpretation of
some influential findings regarding the activation of FP in tasks
with a working memory component. For example, Volle et al.
(2011) showed that patients with FP lesions were impaired on a
PM task where they were asked to perform stimulus-judgments
while concurrently maintaining the intention to push a button
every 30 s. Importantly, they were not impaired when the PM task
was explicitly cued by a visual stimulus (i.e., pressing a button
whenever they saw an animal). Our hypothesis of FP function
could help explain these findings in a novel way as, in the time-
based PM task, patients would have had to continually maintain
and assess the relative value of the two tasks (stimulus-judgement
vs. button-press), which fluctuated depending on the recency of
the latest button-press, whereas no such requirement was present
in the event-based PM task, where the value of the prospective
memory task was explicit when cued.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTION
Taken together, the evidence we presented can be interpreted
within a theoretical framework where FP and dlPFC support
distinct, but complementary and interactive, cognitive processes
that can contribute to more general temporally extended
functions, namely the exploration and evaluation of the value of
novel behavioral alternatives and the implementation of ongoing
behavior based upon what is perceived to be the contextually
most relevant information, respectively. In tasks where action
plans can span long timeframes and/or need to be updated
dynamically in response to contextual changes, dlPFC is essential
to appropriately maintain, select and manipulate information,
rules and behavioral strategies, particularly in the absence of
specific cues that inform the subject about the most appropriate
response. In these dynamic contexts, FP can interact with dlPFC
by providing the latter with information about novel valuable
behavioral options that dlPFC can then encode, maintain and
implement in order to flexibly adapt behavior.
Regarding generalization across species, comparative
functional connectivity studies have suggested that while human
medial FP resembles macaque FP, human lateral FP resembles
dorsolateral area 46 in the macaque as opposed to macaque FP
(Neubert et al., 2014). However, our findings (Boschin et al.,
2015) are consistent with the human imaging literature about
lateral and medial FP function (Boorman et al., 2009, 2011).
Further, the effects of FP lesions doubly-dissociate from the
effects of lesions to posteriorly adjacent dorsolateral areas in
the macaque (i.e., FP lesions impair rapid scene learning but
not short-term rule-memory, whereas principal sulcus lesions
show the reverse pattern of impairments; see Baxter et al., 2008;
Buckley et al., 2009; Boschin et al., 2015; Mansouri et al., 2015),
consistent with existing literature regarding dlPFC’s role in the
maintenance, manipulation and selection of information, rules
and strategies (e.g., Rowe et al., 2000; Petrides, 2000; Forstmann
et al., 2005; Bengtsson et al., 2009). Therefore, from a functional
point of view, there appears to be consistency across species
about the role of these two areas in behavior. One possibility
is that the differences in connectivity observed in Neubert
et al.’s (2014) study were confounded by differences in the
cognitive states of the subjects (i.e., anesthetized animals vs.
restive awake humans). This question certainly deserves further
investigation and an important part of future research will be to
directly relate findings from human and animal studies in the
same brain-state, ideally an active state associated with ongoing
choice-behavior.
Moving forward in the exploration of the role of dlPFC
and FP in these processes, the key concept is interaction. Most
of the data collected so far has stemmed from the study of
individual areas in isolation, but neuroimaging in humans has
begun to draw attention to the highly interactive nature of
activity between PFC and wider cortical networks (Sakai and
Passingham, 2006; Rowe et al., 2007; Boorman et al., 2011).
For example, Sakai and Passingham (2006) showed that FP
appears to influence posterior regions differently depending on
the intended rule to be implemented via context-dependent
changes in functional connectivity between FP and different
task-relevant posterior regions. Furthermore, Rowe et al. (2007)
showed in a related paradigm that when FP was damaged
regions posterior to FP also interacted with each other differently.
However, such data remains correlative. New experimental
methodologies now offer scope to investigate how different
regions causally influence the areas to which they are connected
(and vice-versa) when animals engage in choice behavior,
by employing a combination of simultaneous multi-neuronal
recordings and reversible inactivations and/or lesions during
the same behavioral tasks. Besides their functional differences,
FP and dlPFC also present differences in their anatomical
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connections with other regions. In terms of the specific areas
they are connected to, dlPFC’s connections span a wide network
of both cortical and subcortical structures (Masterman and
Cummings, 1997; Petrides and Pandya, 1999; Yeterian et al.,
2012), while FP’s connections are more robust with higher-
order prefrontal regions and are considerably sparser in more
posterior and subcortical regions (Petrides and Pandya, 2007;
Burman et al., 2011a,b; Yeterian et al., 2012). Furthermore,
even for regions that are connected to both FP and dlPFC,
there can be differences at the level of synaptic connectivity
Medalla and Barbas (2010). Therefore, combining selective
inactivation of FP and dlPFC with recordings, should help
shed light not only on their individual functions, but on how
the neural dynamics in the areas interconnected with these
regions are differentially affected when the former is inactivated
as opposed to the latter, and how that might also affect the
way the interconnected region of interest interacts with its
own different target areas. For neuroscience to progress, we
strongly support the notion that a paradigm shift is required
away from investigating individual regions in isolation towards
investigating how areas interact at the neuronal level both in the
healthy brain and in the face of brain damage, dysfunction and
disease.
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